Media, Propaganda and Iraq

Trying To Find a Link With Terrorism

The Australian paper, The Age noted (September 11, 2002) that the CIA failed to find a link between Iraq and terrorism.

• In addition, "European anti-terrorist officials warned that an invasion of Iraq will worsen the threat of Islamic terrorism", as reported by the Los Angeles Times (January 30, 2003).
• The Bush Administration has constantly tried to highlight a link, in an attempt to muster support and play on the concerns of citizens regarding terrorists. As a propaganda ploy, connecting Iraq with Al Qaeda would be ideal.
• The Age article also points out that the Bush Administration will still try to develop a case to link terrorism and Iraq. Yet, Daniel Benjamin, who previously served on the U.S. National Security Council (1994 to 1999) says in a New York Times op-ed that Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda Are Not Allies.
• An audio recording, allegedly by Osama Bin Laden, in February 2003, was used as further evidence by the U.S. of links.

CIA Plays Down Some Bush Hype

In addition, as the BBC reports (October 10, 2002), the CIA has played down some of the hype that the Bush Administration has raised about Iraq using weapons of mass destruction. Instead, the CIA has said that if Iraq does posses any such weapons, it might use some of them if attacked. (Side NoteIt is interesting to note that the above-mentioned BBC report was titled "CIA undermines propaganda war", thus acknowledging that there is propaganda also from the west and the U.S. in this particular case. Yet, the media in general, including the British media, and the BBC itself has been strongly criticized by Media Lens and other media watchdogs for things like perpetuating propaganda, not questioning propaganda but treating it as news or undisputed fact, and so on. (See for example, the Media Lens alert, November 8 2002, with severe criticism about BBC being subservient to, and hence a mouthpiece of, the British government.))

And the Los Angeles Times reports (October 11, 2002) that "Senior Bush administration officials are pressuring CIA analysts to tailor their assessments of the Iraqi threat to help build a case against Saddam Hussein". (And in his State of the Union Speech, President Bush claimed that there is a link to terrorism, citing intelligence sources. This is discussed further below.)

In addition, as if reiterating The Age's report one month earlier, the LA Times continues: "Evidence of the differences between the agency and the White House surfaced publicly this week when CIA Director George J. Tenet sent a letter to lawmakers saying the Iraqi president is unlikely to strike the United States unless provoked." (Emphasis Added)

In other words then, it was just before 1991, at a time when Iraq was a U.S. ally, that Iraq was militarily a greater threat than at present. In addition, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against his own people was also at the time of receiving such support.

CIA and Bush Differences are Significant

Given that the Bush Administration relied a lot on intelligence sources prior to weapons inspectors going into Iraq for a number of the claims made, and given that the CIA is one of the most prominent intelligence agencies in the world, this difference would appear to be quite significant.

• If the CIA is correct that Saddam Hussein may strike if provoked, then not only is the basis for provocation different to the concerns mentioned by Bush to the public, but in addition, the path taken by the Bush Administration possibly risks the lives of ordinary American citizens as well as Iraqis, not to mention the other geopolitical fallouts war would likely lead to.
• One of the arguments put forward by proponents of war is that something must be done, for if not, then Iraq will do something and we will all regret it.
  • Yet, the CIA highlights that not only will Iraq be unlikely to use chemical weapons but that if attacked, then it might use such weapons in retaliation.
  • In addition, reaction from extremist factions from the Middle East and elsewhere on an unpopular bombing campaign could itself also risk lives of people around the world.
• Furthermore, notions of regime change (which sets a dangerous precedent, both imperialist in its undertones, and giving other nations an excuse to potentially do similar things) has been put forth quite seriously in the United States by the Bush Administration. This could increase antagonisms further.
• Ultimately then, a war on Iraq then might be a self-fulfilling prophecy, risking the lives of citizens in Iraq and also the West.

The Will of the United Nations, or Will of the U.S Through the U.N.?

On 8 November 2002, the controversial resolution, 1441 was adopted unanimously. Surprising for a lot of people was that even Syria, the Arab member on the Council also accepted the resolution. But 1441 was the result of a lot of political maneuvering (i.e. diplomacy).

• The U.S. was initially threatening to take unilateral action (with one or two allies), which would have been illegal according to international law under the United Nations. In order to ensure that the U.S. still took that path of the U.N., other members of the Council dropped various concerns and stances they had in terms of the resolution wording. Side NoteAs foreign policy expert and author, Phyllis Bennis puts it, for most of the U.N. Security Council members, vote to support the resolution "was not about constraining Iraq, it was about constraining the U.S. The message was: if the U.S. desires to launch a massive attack, it will have to return to the U.N. and win its approval. If the president makes war without U.N. backing, it will be violating the United Nations charter and international law."
• The final resolution then is seen as a successful diplomatic effort by the U.S. and U.K. interests.
  • One of the key concerns raised by most states was that the resolution should not automatically mean war and that it should require further U.N. Security Council authorization. This aspect made it into the resolution, but with some controversy.
  • When the Resolution was adopted, the various member nations all gave speeches. Almost all stressed at that time, (and was broadcast on major television news stations) that there is no hidden trigger in the resolution for means automatic war.
  • It was mainly because of this clause that all nations agreed to the resolution. The "will of the United Nations" hardly represents one voiceSo when we are reminded by the likes of Tony Blair, Jack Straw, Colin Powell and others of the "will of the United Nations" being expressed through this resolution, and that member states should therefore live up to their responsibilities and demand war, we should bear in mind that the resolution did not represent a common will, but a number of negotiated differences, and if anything, much of the "will" of the Security Council was to not have automatic war.
  • The U.N. Security council would have to agree once weapons inspections are complete and they report a material breach.
  • Even though later toward justifying war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said a second resolution was not needed, on the day that 1441 was passed, he himself pointed out that it was:

    To those who fear this resolution is just an automatic trigger point, without any further discussion, paragraph 12 of the resolution makes it clear that is not the case.

  • Even the U.S. representative, John Negroponte, and the U.K. representative, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, confirmed this:

    Negroponte (U.S.): As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains no "hidden triggers" and no "automaticity" with respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA or a Member State, the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in paragraph 12.

    Greenstock (U.K.): We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about "automaticity" and "hidden triggers" - the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not rush into military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the Council. Let me be equally clear in response, as a co-sponsor with the United States of the text we have just adopted. There is no "automaticity" in this resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required in paragraph 12. We would expect the Security Council then to meet its responsibilities.

    
    
    
  • Yet, well after those speeches, Bush, Blair and others in their governments have stated that 1441 doesn't require another U.N. resolution for war, even though almost all other U.N. ambassadors and ministers, including their own, say the opposite. Side NoteThis perhaps lends credence to those who argue that either the U.S. and U.K. were just going through the motions to attempt to get support on paper, and/or they did this to allow time to deploy their huge military machine in the Gulf, and that they intended to go to war anyway. The media rarely questions or challenges Bush or Blair when they make such assertions then. This allows propaganda to go unchallenged, thereby strengthening it.
  • While the resolution does not automatically authorize war, it requires weapons inspections combined with very strict conditions for compliance.
  • Yet many point out that the resolution leaves enough vagueness making it open to a lot of interpretation. Due to its strict nature, for example, it is very easy to find fault in compliance on the most minor of details, if needed.
• For an example of a detailed, almost paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the resolution, see the Institute for Public Accuracy's analysis. (Amongst many other things, it also highlights that the Resolution does not authorize automatic war, even though Bush and Blair claim it does so, because, the final article of the Resolution says that the U.N. Security Council "Decides to remain seized of the matter", meaning that it retains jurisdiction, and has not given anyone else the power to act.)

The U.N. resolution, its vagueness, and the 'diplomatic' goings on surrounding it, also highlights concerns that the U.S. and U.K. are pushing for their own geopolitical agendas, but now under the auspices of the United Nations.

Furthermore, the credibility and authority of the U.N. in the area of international law and relations is seriously being questioned, and potentially undermined by two of the countries that helped create it in the first place.

As Karen DeYoung, of the Washington Post also highlights (January 19, 2003), the U.N. resolution "was a model of what its authors called "constructive ambiguity," allowing those favoring military action to say further U.N. agreement was not required, and those against action to say the opposite." Hence the various members were agreed to a resolution, but based on different expectations. Yet, such ambiguity amongst various nations surely threatens to pose a serious issue.

In short, the leverage of aid, military assistance and the like helped win backing. As ordinary citizens, we might find it shocking to read such things, but in the world of geopolitics and "diplomacy", there appears to be little democracy in these processes. Power and influence wins out. So, just to get the U.S. on board, the resolution has been made to have "dangerous ambiguity."

Will or no will, there will be war

Leading up to the resolution, the U.S. and British leaders had often implied that if the U.N. does not act, then they will. In the international arena, this is seen as quite threatening. An article from The Nation magazine described the Bush Administration tactics as "attempting to use UN resolutions improperly to justify an illegal pre-emptive war against Iraq". As the title of that article suggested, this was an attempt at "Subverting the UN".

Even well after that resolution had been passed, Tony Blair and others had pointed out on national television that they were prepared for action if the U.N. did not authorize war. (See further below for more on Tony Blair appearing in a television debate on this and many other issues.) Politicians such as Britain's Jack Straw and Tony Blair have repeatedly highlighted the U.N. resolution as representing the will of the international community to disarm Iraq, not as perhaps as others have seen it, as a last resort to try to get the U.S. in line with international law. Side NoteFor example, on Britain's BBC, February 12, 2003, there was a debate program that included a number of key politicians, including Jack Straw. In that program he said that Security Council members had all agreed on the importance of disarming Iraq (by supporting resolution 1441), and that they all knew that it would result in the use of force if Iraq did not comply. Yet, this went unchallenged, because as various interviews on television at the time of the resolution showed, a number of ambassadors and senior officials from various countries had indicated that they supported the resolution precisely because there wasn't an automatic clause for war, and that the ambiguous term "serious consequences" though it could definitely be interpreted to mean war, didn't necessarily mean so. Furthermore, as Asia Times highlights,

In the above passage, the note of instrumentality is crucial.

• For most nations, the U.N.'s existence is not questionable.
• Yet, for the U.S., it is to be used as and when needed, as has been seen for decades on all sorts of international issues.
• Hence, the U.N. resolution can also be seen as yet another failure, not success, by other states to hold their ground against U.S. and British political and "diplomatic" pressures. (See the above article for more details on how "diplomacy" has been used by the powers to get the votes of the other members in the past as well as present. See also this short article by media critic, Normon Solomon)

But as well as indicating that if the U.N. does not act, the U.S. and U.K. will, some had long suggested that the U.S. and U.K. would act regardless. Even Bush's top security adviser, Dr Richard Perle, has admitted so back in November 2002. UK's Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, and US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had also stated such things, as reported by the Guardian (October 19, 2002).

And possibly complicating matters is that in October 2002, the U.S. Congress had authorized Bush to invade Iraq without U.N Security Council authorization. Yet, this is illegal in international law. As professor of politics, Stephen Zunes highlights, President Bush is violating or disrespecting the U.S. Constitution as well:

As the above highlights, the illegality is important. As media critic David Edwards also adds:

Furthermore, Tony Blair has constantly mentioned, in front of television cameras as well, that if he feels that a Security Council decision not to go to war is unreasonable, then in that situation he may feel obligated to go to war anyway. Not only does this have no basis in international law, but it raises questions on why he should be able to determine if something is reasonable or not, when a large part of the Security Council may have decided the other way. Why is his judgement better than theirs? What would it mean for future situations? Why even bother with the United Nations if its charter is to be validated anyway! (Under international law, a nation may only go to war on two accounts: 1) if it is under attack, 2) if the U.N. Security Council gives authorization.)

Heavy Pressure on Nations to Support the U.S. After 1441

On February 15, 2003, during the day of global protest, discussed further below, where millions took to the streets, in London, the London Mayor, Ken Livingston highlighted in a speech how the U.N. diplomacy process to get the 1441 resolution was fraught with political maneuvering, and described it as "corruption" and "bribery" of the U.N. by the U.S. and U.K. in the way they arm-twisted other Security Council members to get in line. He then warned listeners to beware of similar processes in any other subsequent calls for a U.N. resolution.

It is interesting to note that as well as pressure for support on the U.N. Security Council the U.S. had continued to using its diplomatic abilities to gain support of key nations in the area as well.

• Reuters reported (February 15, 2003) that, "The United States was offering Turkey an expanded aid package that includes about $6 billion in grants and up to $20 billion in loan guarantees to secure Ankara's support in a possible invasion of Iraq" and that "The Bush administration is finalizing separate multibillion-dollar aid packages for Israel and Jordan."
• The Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) highlights (February 14, 2003) that the U.S. had offered three other members of the Council some incentives to side with the U.S. position and "approved an extra $4.1 million for the resettlement of returnees to Angola. It has given an extra $2.1 million for the care of Liberian refugees, much of which will go to Guinea. And it has promised 'more leeway' on immigration restrictions on Pakistani nationals."

Some of these sums may sound like little money, but for poor countries these can be crucial. The CIIR highlights the example of Yemen:

Of course, we expect all nations to be involved in this form of diplomacy, and indeed, nations such as France and Germany also tried to talk to the U.S. and U.K., and the other way round. Yet what is worth highlighting is that how this was (and is) spun by officials can perhaps be misleading as to the true nature of those diplomatic processes. The New York Times posted the above-mentioned Reuters article, but the previous link is to a reposted version at truthout.org because it included an interesting editor's comment, that rather than the U.S. creating a coalition of the willing, it was more like a "coalition of the bought and paid for." When thought of with that perspective, the claims of Bush and Blair of genuine support seem a bit more questionable.

The Washington D.C.-based Institute for Policy Studies is even more blunt, asking, as the title of a report, asking, is this a Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?

As they highlight, they find that:

• Although the Bush Administration claims that the anonymous "Coalition of the Willing" is the basis of genuine multilateralism, the report shows that most were recruited through coercion, bullying, and bribery.
• The pursuit of access to U.S. export markets is a powerful lever for influence over many countries, including Chile and Costa Rica, both of which are close to concluding free trade deals with the United States; African nations that want to maintain U.S. trade preferences; and Mexico, which depends on the U.S. market for about 80 percent of its export sales.
• The populations of the countries in the so-called "Coalition of the Willing" make up only about 10 percent of the world's population. Opponents of the U.S. position currently include the leading economies of four continents (Germany, Brazil, China, and South Africa).
• President Bush could make or break the chances of Eastern European members of the "Coalition of the Willing" that are eager to become members of NATO. In order for these nations to join the military alliance, Bush must ask the Senate for approval.

The following summarized from links provided below, are some of the areas that were targeted to try and persuade undecided or opposed countries in the Security Council by the U.S., U.K., Spain etc using their "diplomatic" abilities:

• Guniea: More money and fewer human rights

  The United States is top of the list in terms of aid to this, one of the 15 poorest countries in the world, with 50 million dollars. There are 300,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone, and recently, Washington had promised increased aid to help deal with this. In addition, human rights in Guniea is not great. These could all be overlooked for a favorable vote.
• Angola: Oil Contracts

  Emerging from a 27 year civil war, with millions of refugees, this nation depends a lot on America, economically. It is also one of the most corrupt countries. Exxon recently concluded a 3 billion dollar oil contract. Angola is the sixth largest supplier of oil to the U.S. (ahead of Kuwait), selling some 5 billion dollars each year to the U.S.
• Mexico: Immigration Agreement Suspension

  As detailed further below, Mexico has been subtly threatened or pressured that if it doesn't side with the Americans it could "stir up feelings" against Mexicans in the U.S. In addition, some 80% of Mexican exports go to the U.S. Mexico was also hoping the U.S. would follow up on its earlier promise of amnesty for the large number of illegal Mexican immigrants in the U.S.
• Chile: Free-Trade Agreement

  One of Chile's main economic concerns is to join the American Free Trade Agreement (FTA). However, while it is close to being a done deal, they are waiting on the U.S. Congress to ratify that agreement. This can therefore be used as a lever against Chile.
• Cameroon: Bartered Commercial Assistance

  Cameroon sells some 2.3 billion dollars of oil to Italy, France and Spain in that order. Italy and Spain are strong supporters of war. Its depleting oil reserves means that it will depend on an oil pipeline from Chad. This is being built by Exxon and Texaco Chevron.
• Pakistan: Kashmir in the Balance

  Despite what militants in Pakistan might think (and a large majority of the ordinary citizens), the government needs U.S. support. The risk of going against the U.S. could even mean the Americans get even more friendly with India, in an already tense situation with Kashmir and other issues.
• For more details about the above, see for example, the following:
  • Security Council minnows under pressure in UN vote scramble, an interview with Martin Walker of UPI, by Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC), March 10, 2003
  • Concerns About The Undecided Six to be Seduced, by Pascal Riche, La Liberation, March 6, 2003. (Link is to translated version of the French original.)

Consider one of the ways in which the U.S. tried to pressure its neighbor Mexico, which also has a seat on the U.N. Security Council:

Chile, another nation on the Security Council also found pressure being applied to it to side for war. Inter Press Service (IPS) reported (March 10, 2003) that Chile senator Carlos Ominami said that "Chile, like the other non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, are subjected to all sorts of pressures from Washington to vote in favour of the resolution against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein."

The pressure applied does not always mean though that the U.S. would automatically or easily get its way.

• The BBC had reported that while the Turkish government were interested in a large deal, the population was as much as 94% opposed to a war with Iraq, making Turkey's position difficult.
• In addition, Turkey had said it wanted to enter part of Northern Iraq, to "secure its interests" to which the Kurds there, already controling northern parts of Iraq, feeling threatened, were very strongly opposed, warning of clashes if that happens. The Kurds and Turkey have long had violent disputes in that area.
• Three African nations on the U.N. Security Council, Guinea, Cameroon and Angola, were part of a 52-nation African summit held by France, where they indicated support for France's stance.

But the media described the processes more benignly, presenting it as a challenge for Bush and Blair who would be under intense pressure to use more "diplomacy".

The U.S. had used its diplomatic muscle and abilities to try and obtain support, while claiming it as "willing" support. Some nations though, appeared to have a chance to have a go at their own diplomacy and try and use this situation to their own advantage, sensing opportunities they rarely get. Channel 4 News in UK for example, pointed out (February 26, 2003) how Mexico tried to highlight George Bush's promise of amnesty for millions of illegal Mexican immigrants in the U.S. but never gave it. This was therefore seen as an opportunity to push for it. (In the end, nothing came of it.) Turkey, while on the whole being pressured with incentives was trying to play the game as well, with its own demands. But this does not negate that the U.S. strongly pressured for international community support, highlighting both that international opinion was against war, and that the U.S., U.K. and other supporters of war are less than honest when describing a supposed coalition as "willing".

U.S. Evesdropping on Other Council Members

It was revealed in a leaked memo, obtained by the British paper, The Observer (March 2 2003) that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had targetted other Council member nations for surveillance by tapping phones and intercepting emails, etc, in a bid to find ways to pressure those countries to back the U.S. plans for war against Iraq.

The Observer described this as "dirty tricks" adding that, "The disclosure comes at a time when diplomats from the countries have been complaining about the outright 'hostility' of US tactics in recent days to persuade then to fall in line, including threats to economic and aid packages."

In addition, the above-mentioned IPS highlights that this is not new, and continues that, "Former [Chilean] foreign minister and Christian-democrat senator Gabriel Valdés, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the government should present a formal protest before the UN about the U.S. espionage operations. 'I served 10 years at the United Nations. I was under-secretary general, and there were continuous complaints from countries that the U.S. government was tapping their telephones,' said the senator, father of Juan Gabriel Valdés, Chile's current ambassador to the UN and directly affected by the spying."

This has been serious enough an issue for the United Nations to start an inquiry into the American spying.

UN Security Council is Undemocratic; General Assembly Harder to Buy Out

This also once again highlights the undemocratic nature of the United Nations Security Council.

• For years, many have pointed out that the idea of five permanent members forms a non-democratic "nuclear club" which reflects old power structures.
• Veto powers by those five also add to the non-democratic nature.
• Finally, in situations such as this Iraq crisis, the more inclusive U.N. General Assembly, which is where all members get a voice (but not a vote), would be harder to buy out.

Inspection Process So Far Reveals No Reason For War

In March 1999, UNSCOM, reported on the state of the weapons inspections program to date and revealed the following:

The above indicates that a great deal of Iraq's capabilities had already been destroyed. The report no doubt highlights that not everything was destroyed, but does suggest that the inspection process had been effective in contributing to the containment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.

As detailed further below, a key defector, often cited by Colin Powell and others, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation had stated categorically in 1995 when he defected to Jordan that "All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed."

Even by the beginning of 2003, Hans Blix reported at the United Nations (January 9, 2003) that they had so far found no "smoking gun". Since then, with continued inspections, to date there had been no compelling reason to justify war. Blix has highlighted on many occassions that there were still some questions outstanding and that although Iraq has been cooperating, they need to provide more substance and need to be more forthcoming and urgent about it.

January 27, 2003 Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, and Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), delivered a report to the U.N. Security Council on the inspection process so far.

• On the one hand they pointed out that Iraq has largely cooperated with arms experts.
• In addition, according to El Baradei, there was nothing to suggest a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, though indicating that Iraq should be more "pro-active" in helping nuclear experts do their work.
• Yet, Hans Blix also highlighted concerns about unaccounted-for chemical weapons, and processes such as interviewing scientists, as only a small number had been interviewed so far.
• They both urged for more time to complete the inspection process, which they highlighted as being quite successful in the past at eliminating most of Iraq's large weapons, and should therefore be given more time to continue.
• Their report was also seen by American and British officials as more proof that Iraq was defying the United Nations while other nations seemed less hard-lined.
• However, as the Sydney Morning Herald also reports, (February 1, 2003), Hans Blix has said that the "US is misquoting my Iraq report" Summarizing from their article:
  • "Dr Blix took issue with what he said were US Secretary of State Colin Powell's claims that the inspectors had found that Iraqi officials were hiding and moving illicit materials within and outside of Iraq to prevent their discovery. He said that the inspectors had reported no such incidents."
  • Blix also said that "he had not seen convincing evidence that Iraq was sending weapons scientists to other countries to prevent them from being interviewed."
  • And continuing on from the above, the article continues that "Nor had he any reason to believe, as President George Bush charged in his State of the Union speech, that Iraqi agents were posing as scientists, or that his inspection agency had been penetrated by Iraqi agents and that sensitive information might have been leaked to Baghdad." (Side Note Perhaps an additional irony of Bush's claim is that in 1998 it wasn't Baghdad intelligence penetrating the inspection agency, but western intelligence agents, as mentioned further up.)
  The New York Times posted the same article but titled it as Blix Says He Saw Nothing to Prompt a War

Pressure by a number of members of the U.N. Security Council allowed for another report by Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei on February 14, 2003, which would be a key report, giving strong indications of whether or not war might occur. However, just two days after their January report, George Bush, in his State of the Union Speech made claims that were counter to the findings of Blix and El Baradei. (Bush's State of the Union Speech is discussed further below.)

The Washington Post also reports (February 12, 2003) that on February 11, 2003, just a few days before this key presentation by Blix, the U.S. National Security adviser, Condoleezza Rice had an unannounced meeting with Hans Blix, "to press chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix to acknowledge in a Security Council briefing Friday that Iraq has failed to voluntarily scrap its prohibited chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, according to U.S. and U.N. diplomats." However this is controversial.

• This tactic "underscored the Bush administration's concern that the Swedish diplomat's report to the council on Friday, while critical of Iraq, may not be decisive enough to persuade wavering Security Council members to support an immediate move to war", as the Post continues.
• This unfair pressure to get Blix to tailor the report to suit the objectives of the Bush Administration, is described by editors of Truthout.org, a media watchdog, as "at its core, ruthless and unacceptable" and that this is a "reason that the US is today, widely viewed around the world as dictatorial."

Like the January report, the February 14, 2003 report by Blix and El Baradei again confirmed no "smoking gun" which could justify war, and no nuclear weapons program.

• Blix politely criticized some of the claims Colin Powell had made (as "evidence") in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council a few days earlier (this is also discussed further below).
• All in all, it would seem that there has not been enough to justify a war, though both inspectors highlighted the need for continued pressure on Iraq.
• They further highlighted the need for continued inspection process (implying not military action), and also suggested that these processes were working.
• This of course did not go down well with the American and British positions.
• The report did not trigger a move by the U.S. and U.K. of a second U.N. Security Council resolution, this time to authorize war.
• Tony Blair had stressed in a televised interview (detailed further below) that if the U.N. Security Council would not authorize war, then under some conditions, the U.S. and U.K. may take action anyway.
• While this has been criticized as arrogant and a violation of international law, that had not deterred Blair from taking that stance, though, as noted below in more detail, the February 15 report has been so damning to the U.S. and U.K. position, and not highlighted any imminent threat, that his propaganda tactic has now appeared to change course.
• The following day, in the largest protest against war to date (at time of writing), some 10 million people turned out in various cities around the world, even in countries already against war. This further angered officials such as Tony Blair (also discussed further below).

Another major report by Blix and El Baradei on March 7, 2003 revealed that

• The inspection process is having a positive impact, but it would not take weeks, which the Anglo-American position demands, but it would not take years that opposers also demand. Instead, it would be a matter of months.
• That Iraq was showing signs of buckling from international pressure into accelerating cooperation with weapons inspections and conceeding a "substantial measure of disarmament".
• El Baradei mentioned that again there was no evidence of a revival of a nuclear weapons program. He had stressed this many times on previous occassions, but the American and British position is that regardless of what El Baradei has said, they believe otherwise.
• There was enough in this report to fuel both war mongering and anti war positions. For example, Colin Powell said that Blix and El Baradei's reports highlighted "a catalogue of non co-operation" whereas the French foreign minister, while French/German and others highlighted that the same report showed that instead the inspection process was actually working.
• Blix did highlight that while there was cooperation, there was not the "immediate" cooperation that the U.N. resolution 1441 demanded. (Whether this would be enough to justify war, which Colin Powell hinted, is another issue, which the rest of this page attempts to shed some light on.)
• In addition, interviewing scientists was still proving difficult, because even though there were no Iraqi minders, the scientists were being bugged.
• But significantly, the reports dismissed some major claims by the U.S.:
  • Blix said there was no evidence to that Iraq was hiding biological and chemical weapons in mobile laboratories and underground shelters, a claim made by Colin Powell earlier in February. (Side NoteThis would also negate the need to use small nuclear weapons by the U.S., as they said they would, which is also discussed further below.)
  • Also highlighted was that that claims about Iraq trying to purchase Uranium from Africa were based on documents that were "not authentic". Obtaining Uranium from Africa was something raised, for example, by Tony Blair in his dossier earlier in 2002, also discussed below, yet Blix here is suggested that the intelligence was fake, having been forged and fabricated, as the Washington Post describes it (March 8, 2003).
  • The IAEA also mentioned that there was no evidence of resumed nuclear activities in buildings rebuilt since 1988, and no evidence that Iraq had attempted to import uranium since 1990.
  • In addition, detailed examination of imported aluminium tubes revealed that they were not destined for use in enriching uranium, which has been another claim by the U.S. and U.K.

In sum then, it would seem that some of the main claims to justify war seems to have proven hollow.

The weapons programs took decades to develop with a lot of outside assistance, which is now all lacking. Continued inspections, repeatedly stressed by the current weapons inspection teams and some nations, therefore has some merit to it as an alternative to war. War being a last resort, as we are also reminded by Bush and Blair themselves, would mean that ideally weapons inspections should perhaps be given a further chance. Peaceful disarmament is the phrase used by many, including war mongers, as the preferred way.

No Nuclear Weapons Program

As detailed elsewhere on this section, months of intrusive inspections by the IAEA has revealed no nuclear program in Iraq. In addition, as mentioned by Blix and El Baradei in their report to the U.N. Security Council in March, 2003 that

• There was no evidence to that Iraq was hiding biological and chemical weapons in mobile laboratories and underground shelters, a claim made by Colin Powell earlier in February.
• Claims about Iraq trying to purchase Uranium from Africa were based on documents that were "not authentic".
• There was no evidence of resumed nuclear activities in buildings rebuilt since 1988.
• There was no evidence that Iraq had attempted to import uranium since 1990.
• Detailed examination of imported aluminium tubes revealed that they were not destined for use in enriching uranium.

These were all claims that the U.S. and U.K. had made in various "intelligence" briefings.

Iraq Declaration

During the U.N. investigations in Iraq in December 2002, Iraq had to produce a declaration of its weapons programs and list its position and detail what it had, what it was using etc. Iraq produced a 12,000 page declaration.

The issue raised of omissions in the Iraq report for data after 1998 is of concern of course. Iraq maintains that there is no omission because there has been no weapons of mass destruction development since 1998 hence there is nothing to report. Yet, Blix and others have legitimate questions about what the status of certain items now is and where the documentary proof is.

In addition, at the United Nations press conferences, as Inter Press Service (IPS) reports, (December 19, 2002) the U.S. was the only country to accuse Iraq of being in "material breach" of its obligations. That IPS article also mentions an interview with Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law who points out that "it is for the Security Council to determine whether or not there has been a material breach of these resolutions" not the United States or any other individual nation. Furthermore, Boyle adds that the Bush Administration "has no right to deputise itself as the judge, jury and lord high executioner of international law".

Hans Blix did indicate in his interview to the press at the United Nations (19 December, 2002) that his report to the Security Council was not the final report and more analysis will still be done. Yet, whether these concerns can justify a war or not is perhaps highlighted by the following:

Nuclear Documents at Scientists Home

In addition, around the beginning of 2003 new documents discovered at the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist raised more concerns, due to fears of possibly relating to the development of nuclear weapons. The scientist has been adamant that these were old personal documents, and mostly concerned research into technology that proved infeasible. UN officials acknowledged to the press (e.g. BBC, January 19, 2003) that much of what was in these documents were known. A concern has been that some of these documents would be found in a home of a private citizen, and so what else could be in such places.

Discovery of Empty "Chemical Warheads" No Big Deal Says Blix

On 16th January 2003, the UN inspections teams discovered empty warheads that could potentially be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons.

• As reported by AFP (January 18, 2003), the White House found the discovery to be "troubling and serious".
• At that same time, in contrast, "inspections chief Hans Blix downplayed the find as 'not a big deal'" as the AFP also reported.
• And just some two weeks later, Hans Blix confirmed his initial reaction. As the New York Times reported on an interview with Blix,

  Mr. Blix said that his examination of a liquid-filled warhead that inspectors had discovered in a bunker on Jan. 16 found no signs of any chemical weapons agent. The other 11 warheads found in the bunker were empty, he said, adding that scores of samples his team had taken across Iraq in the past two months had turned up "no trace" of either chemical or biological agents.

• Side note

  It is also interesting to note some points made by William Rivers Pitt, author of the book 'War on Iraq', which has been a best seller on a number of newspaper lists, such as the New York Times, Washington Post and others. He points out that the a lot of the mainstream have been referring to the discovered weapons as "chemical warheads" when in fact they are artillery munitions, and that even using the term warhead is misleading. In addition, Iraq is allowed to have certain weapons, including the ones found. The implication then, is that the use of the term "chemical warhead" is subtle propaganda.

(Further below, in the part that looks at George Bush's 2003 State of the Union Speech, there is more information about unaccounted for chemical and biological weapons.)

Short Shelf Life of Some Chemical Weapons

Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector in 1998 has pointed out that a number of chemical weapons that Saddam Hussein may have hidden from inspectors in 1998 would now be useless as some of them only have a 3-year shelf life. Given that such a large quantity was already destroyed by 1998, and more may have become useless, to rebuild all that (this time without support from key powers), would appear to be rather difficult.

In addition, Professor Glen Rangwala, a lecturer in politics at Cambridge University in Britain provides detailed analysis of the state of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Amongst many things he notes that

Getting Information from Defectors

While there have been occasional mention by officials and mainstream reports that defectors from Iraq show that Saddam Hussein is indeed developing nuclear weapons, it seems that less reported in the mainstream is that some other defectors actually argue that point. Imad Khadduri, for example, a former nuclear scientist in Iraq worked at the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission from 1968 until 1998, when he left Iraq. He admits he was involved in various programs including nuclear weapons research as well as meeting U.N. weapons inspectors. However, in an article for YellowTimes.org he finds that "present allegations about Iraq's nuclear capability, as continuously advanced by the Americans and the British, to be ridiculous." He argues that the whole state apparatus was redirected to rebuild other destroyed industries and in addition, the nuclear scientists and others working on these programs have been reduced to poverty and lack of updated skills.

As the Bush administration looks toward, and encourages more defectors that support their view, the defector's own agendas must also be considered. Khidhir Hamza, for example, author of Saddam's Bombmaker, has written that Saddam may have up to three nuclear weapons and so must be removed from power. However, Khadduri, mentioned above, has written claiming Hamza to be lying. Khadduri claims that Hamza was not a high level nuclear scientist in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, as he claimed, but a low-level official, as Khadduri knew him quite well.

Responding to Colin Powell's presentation on February 5, 2003 to the United Nations Security Council of supposed evidence, the Washington Post (February 6, 2003), noted that Jonathan Tucker, a former weapons inspector and currently a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace said that "the sources apparently were defectors, who have not always been reliable or credible" and as the article title had highlighted, "despite defectors' accounts, evidence remains anecdotal."

Bush and Blair Not Cooperating On Sharing Information

One of the main themes of the whole crisis has been about how key officials such as Bush and Blair have evidence of Iraq building weapons of mass destruction, but are unable to share it with anyone.

• Yet, so many around the world have been asking where the proof is.
• However, the promised intelligence from U.K. and the U.S. has (at time of writing) been very limited, with even Tony Blair and Colin Powell indicating that they are only giving a small amount of information at this time. The U.S. and U.K. fear of compromising their intelligence sources, so have said they will give more information as it becomes more evident that they can do so safely.
• At the same time, France for example has urged all governments to share data. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said in a conference in Moscow on January 7, 2003 that "all countries with specific information must convey it", implying U.K. and U.S. should urgently share more of their intelligence (Associated Press, January 8, 2003).
• President Bush indicated in his 2003 State of the Union Speech at the end of January that on February 5, Colin Powell would meet the U.N. Security Council and share intelligence about Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorist groups.
• While a number of nations welcomed this, many were asking various questions that if important information had been known for so long on illegal weapons programs, why had it not been shared with the weapons inspection team? And, in addition, if at the same time Bush and Blair are talking in terms of weeks for action, how would this information be used by the inspection teams? Would the various governments who see this information be given enough time to analyze and verify it for themselves? From some perspectives then, this whole process was been described as hampering the U.N. inspection team's ability to do their work most effectively.
• It turned out that Powell's evidence was not very good (see below for more details on this).
• Against accusations of not providing sufficient information, the CIA rejects those charges. The LA Times reports (March 8, 2003) that "In a letter to key lawmakers released Thursday night, CIA Director George J. Tenet said the agency has 'provided detailed information on all of the high-value and moderate sites' to the United Nations."
• However, the same LA Times article continues, "A U.S. intelligence official said some of the information the CIA has compiled is of such low value that it would not be useful to inspectors."
• The UN Security Council Resolution 1441, clause 10 "Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes."
• On the one hand as detailed below, Powell gives a lot of information. However, this is all the way on February 5, 2003 and furthermore, the information he gives is questionable. If the U.S., U.K. and other nations have information, they are not providing it.
• In his March 7, 2003 report to the United Nations Security Council, amongst many other things (discussed above), Hans Blix also highlighted the it would be preferable to have better information on sites than double the number of inspectors.

Unmanned Drones

In March 2003, Tony Blair and others had raised concerns about unmanned drones, as part of the various things to quantify in a draft second resolution. Yet, this issue was already dismissed in October 2002. The Washington Post highlighted (October 22, 2002) amongst other inaccuracies, such as claims by Bush of Iraq having unmanned aircraft that could be used "for missions targeting the United States". However, the Post pointed out that the CIA itself had said that this was more an experiment or attempt, and that if there was any threat, it was to neighbors, and international military forces in the region, not mentioning sufficient range to reach the United States. One would also think that they would be no match for the U.S./U.K. air forces, especially with the no-fly zones enforced since the end of the Gulf War in 1991.

Iraq Missiles

In February, just days before Blix's February 14, 2003 report to the United Nations Security Council, there were fresh allegations of material breach after discover of a missile, part of the Al Samoud 2 rocket program, that could possibly travel beyond the limits imposed at the end of the Gulf War. Britain and U.S., in particular have been quick to jump onto this allegation to imply a "serious" material breach, and point to Iraqi deceptions, etc. Yet,

• It was Iraq that actually disclosed this information, fueling the argument that the inspection process may have some merit.
• As the BBC highlighted (February 13, 2003), "a panel of experts summoned by UN weapons inspectors said the missile could travel up to 180km (112 miles), just over the 150km limit imposed by the UN after the Gulf War." (Emphasis Added). That is, it was not confirmed for sure that it did go these distances, and even if it could, it would only amount to some 30km (less than 19 miles) over the limit. Iraq also claims that when weighed down by a guidance system, the range is within the limits. This has still to be confirmed though at time of writing.
• Contrasting Washington's claim of seriousness, the Washington Post reported (February 13, 2003) that "U.N. diplomats and missile experts maintain that the current ranges of Iraq's missiles do not significantly alter the military balance in the region."
• In addition, another BBC report, (February 20, 2003), reveals that the weapons inspectors are being pressured, presumably by the U.S. for a favorable report. "[Russian] Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the inspectors were being pushed to leave Iraq or to write reports that said Iraq was not complying with UN demands."

But Iraq was initially hesitant to let go of this weapon system amidst threats of war. Stephen Shalom adds that

In early March, Iraq agreed, reluctantly, to destroy these weapons.

As some have asked then, is this really worth going to war over?

Some Intelligence is Not Very Intelligent

As discussed further below in more detail, a number of key pieces of evidence that Colin Powell presented in February 2003, was dismissed by Hans Blix himself, such as evidence of mobile biological weapons laboratories, and Iraq foiling inspection processes by moving equipment before teams would arrive. In general, Powell's sources appeared vague. A key intelligence document turned out to be plagarized from a report describing the situation in the early 1990s.

As mentioned above, intelligence from the U.S. and U.K. has been either limited or, as one U.S. intelligence officer revealed "of such low value that it woudl not be useful to inspectors."

In other cases, major threats have been exaggerated or falsified, such as the imminent threat and a nuclear weapons program.

CBS News reports Inspectors Call U.S. Tips 'Garbage':

(CBS also points out, "The inspectors do acknowledge, however, that they would not be here at all if not for the threat of U.S. military action.)

In Australia, another key nation that backs the U.S./U.K. stance, a senior Australian intelligence officer quit in protest over Australia's support for a possible war against Iraq. The senior analyst, Andrew Wilkie, at the intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments (ONA), said the Australian Government's policy on Iraq was "dumb" and "not worth the risk". He raised similar concerns that the CIA have raised (mentioned further up) that, "Going to war against Iraq, invading Iraq is exactly the course of action that is most likely to cause Saddam to do the things that we are trying to prevent." (Side NoteThe Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in an attempt to discredit Wilkie, questioned his seniority, but Australian opposition leader Simon Crean says that Wilkie "was going to be put on the Iraq taskforce if Australia went to war. Now don't tell me that's not senior, don't tell me that's not connected." It was interesting to note a subtle propaganda technique here of discrediting, and a reverse psychology of sorts, whereby the foreign minister said in respect to all his dealings with the ONA that "In Mr Wilkie's case he is, I'm not sure how senior to be honest, I'm not sure he's terribly senior in the media, he will be increasingly senior over the next few days as is the way, but in any case I may have met him - I don't remember meeting him but I could be wrong there.")

As some have asked then, is this really worth going to war over when the international community is unable to verify or see this intelligence, or disagrees with the general concern about Iraq's threat?

Is it Worth a War?

David Edwards, was quoted further above, relating to the find on possible chemical warheads (to which Hans Blix had said it was "not a big deal", also mentioned above) that to a lot of media and politicians, it seemed there was "No need to question if use of these awesome weapons - described by arms inspectors as battlefield weaponry of minimal importance - might be deterred by the US's 6,144 nuclear warheads." Combining that with the latest Iraq missile disclosure, such questions of whether it is still worth killing people over, is perhaps still valid.

In addition, the following, also from back in December 2002, perhaps also raises this question:

The Blair Dossier: Proof or Propaganda to build the case against Iraq?

The Blair government in UK has been supporting Bush's position quite vocally. Yet there has been a lot of skepticism around the world about whether or not Iraq really does pose the threat that Bush and Blair describe (especially after 10 years of crippling sanctions). As a result, a lot of people around England (including many member's of Blair's own government) have constantly been demanding more concrete proof if they are to support sending people into another war (and one that requires regime change may imply more troops on the ground, something a lot of Americans and British are wary about).

Under public pressure, Tony Blair promised a dossier which he said contained the information people were demanding, though he delayed its release (with no explanation why) until less than a day before Parliament was recalled to debate the issue (which meant politicians had less time to analyze the details in the dossier or verify the points and facts). This was all around September 2002.

A number of British media outlets contained articles that pointed out the dossier was not as ground breaking as might have been perceived, though at the same time, many commentators were also not expecting too much from this. Prior to Tony Blair's release of the dossier, some of his own Labour Party members produced what they described as a "Counter Dossier" with many issues that refuted Blair's official line.

For some additional and more detailed analysis of the Blair dossier, see the following for example:

• Notes further to the Counter dossier by one of the authors of the counter dossier that was produced in response to Blair's dossier.
• Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Zaid Al-Ali that looks at a number of claims made by Blair and shows them to be false.

Indeed, as Robert Fisk highlights, for example, there were so many "ifs and buts" that this dossier did not provide much concrete information, mostly speculation. A number of other nations such as Russia, France, Germany and others had also reacted negatively in various ways to this dossier suggesting that it should be left to independent investigators to come out with this information (such as under the U.N.), and that Blair's dossier amounted to propaganda.

As an aside, while the media have not commented much on the decade or so of sanctions, they have had a devastating effect on the people of Iraq, to the extent that key U.N. officials have resigned over these sanction policies (blaming them for the misery in Iraq, more than blaming Saddam Hussein, incidentally). When commenting on the deaths of children caused by sanctions, in 1998 Madeline Albright, then Secretary of State in the U.S. had said that the price was worth it:

Yet, as Fisk highlights another concern about Blair's dossier, if the dossier is correct, then the brutal sanctions and resulting deaths amounted to "nothing":

Weapons Inspectors Were Not Kicked Out in 1998, but Withdrawn

As another common example also reported often by the mainstream media, Iraq supposedly kicked out the U.N. weapons inspectors in 1998.

• The inspectors were not kicked out, but withdrawn by the U.S. in order for the bombing to commence.
• It was also claimed that Iraq was not cooperating and that this was another reason for withdrawing.
• However, there were many reports from U.S. newspapers that CIA engineers were working amongst the UN inspection team.
• Iraq therefore felt it had some legitimate reasons not to cooperate any more.

Media watchdog Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) highlights the difference in reporting by contrasting various reports from December 1998 and now, showing that it was fully reported then that inspectors were withdrawn, not kicked out.

Media Lens, in a similar way to FAIR mentioned above, contrast the reporting of 1998/1999, with 2002, by the British media, and note a similar parallel to FAIR, whereby in 1998/1999 it was reported that inspectors were withdrawn, though now it has become a claim that they were kicked out. In summing up, they are quite blunt about the media and its role in supporting, or not critiquing, statements from officials:

In addition, another subtle change in media reporting more recently has been how the mention of CIA spying is dealt with:

• Back in 1998 when it was first reported, it became widely acknowledged and accepted that this indeed happened.
• However, the more recent coverage describes it as Iraqi claims.
• As FAIR describes in the title of an article of theirs, the media has moved from fact to allegation. "Suddenly," they add, "facts that [Washington Post's] own correspondents confirmed three years ago in interviews with top U.S. officials are being recycled as mere allegations coming from Saddam Hussein's regime."

As well as the media describing the withdrawal of inspectors as them being kicked out, David Edwards highlights quite scathingly how Bush and Blair have described it, in contrast to what actually happened:

The age-old propaganda technique of demonizing the enemy lends well to these accusations, which have often been repeated constantly by top level officials, almost to the extent that the lie becomes a truth in some circles. This subtle propaganda technique can serve to discredit or minimize the issue (because one can claim that the vile Iraqi regime said it, so there cannot be any credibility to it whatsoever).

Tony Blair Faces a Skeptical TV Audience

At what could initially be thought of as a somewhat courageous decision, given the huge skepticism and lack of support for war in Britain, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, decided to sit in a televised interview where a small audience of ordinary citizens would question his policies, on February 6, 2003. This was on the BBC's Newsnight program.

However, while this might appear as part of a democratic process, where leaders are to be held accountable, this was seen by some as a charade by the BBC. That is, when real experts could have instead faced Tony Blair, we instead had ordinary citizens, who no doubt posed good questions to Blair, but would perhaps be unable to counter all of Blair's points immediately. David Edwards, with more criticism of this media and government process highlights this and is worth quoting again:

In addition, one of Tony Blair's own Labour Party Members of Parliament, Dianne implied in a BBC political program following up on this interview on the same day that Blair's "inner circle" was very close minded. She also noted that this circle believed a lot in "Blair Myth". Basically she was implying that there is something similar to group think going on, which makes it harder for them to relate to the enormous skepticism in the country and amongst even the Labour Party's own Parliament members. She also added that he was "very Thatcherite".

There have been a number of televised debates with experts and politicians defending the need for war and action, while skeptical audiences pose tough questions. Yet, often (not always), experts that oppose war and could really challenge points made by politicians supporting war, are rarely present or given the chance to take up all the points. This may be unintentional in cases where the agenda of the debate seems to be driven by the television time allowed, but the effect is that this can allow subtle propaganda to go unchallenged.

Subtle Propaganda

Bush's State of the Union Speech on Iraq

Just two days after chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and IAEA director general, Mohamed El Baradei reported to the U.N. Security Council on the inspection process, George Bush delivered his State of the Union Speech in the U.S. While he covered many other issues, such as the state of the U.S. economy, environment, terrorism (though, interestingly as some observers pointed out, he didn't mention Osama Bin Laden's name once!), Iraq was an important part of that speech. In it he reiterated the objectives for a war on Iraq:

• to eliminate Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
• to diminish the threat of international terrorism;
• to promote democracy in Iraq and surrounding areas

But, as expected by most, the speech was an opportunity for George Bush to make claims and push forth an agenda where so many people would be listening. The risk of unaccountable propaganda therefore was high.

• For example, George Bush highlighted in that speech that Saddam Hussein had been attempting to procure aluminum for use in enriching uranium, for nuclear weapons development. Yet, just two days earlier, El Baradei had reported to the U.N. Security Council that this was not the case and that they were for conventional rocket systems. Under the U.N. sanctions, Iraq is permitted some conventional weaponry.
• As mentioned above, a Sydney Morning Herald article (February 1, 2003) had pointed out that in an interview, Hans Blix had said that the U.S. was misquoting his Iraq report. Amongst other things, in Bush's speech, he had claimed that that Iraqi agents were posing as scientists, or that Blix's inspection agency had been penetrated by Iraqi agents and that sensitive information might have been leaked to Baghdad. Hans Blix said he does not have reason to believe this.
• Bush also stated that "All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks, and we're asking them to join us, and many are doing so" then adding that, "Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."
  • This can be interpreted to imply that the U.S. is willing to go it alone when the international community would disagree.
  • Yet, this also violates international law, all the more significant when it comes to war.
  • The charges by many of irony or hypocrisy here is that on the one hand Saddam Hussein must follow U.N. resolutions and international law, and even be bombed for failing to comply, yet, the U.S. "does not depend on the decision of others" as if it is above the rest.
• A number of claims were made about unaccounted for biological and chemical weapons with the use of chilling numbers on how serious the concerns were. So too were various details on how Iraq was not cooperating. Yet, most of these points made were questionable, as highlighted by the following annotation of the speech, by the Institute for Public Accuracy (the annotations are indented and preceded by the analysts name). It is a detailed annotation, and is quoted here at length:

  The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons materials sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax; --

  Glen Rangwala , a lecturer in politics at Cambridge University in Britain: "No, they didn't. The UNSCOM January 1999 report states that there is insufficient evidence that Iraq didn't produce this volume of anthrax spores. In short, if Iraq had used its fermentors at maximal capacity from the start of the industrial production of anthrax in September 1990 until the outbreak of war, it could have produced this amount of anthrax. The production log for 1990 at Iraq's bio-weapons factory, al-Hakam, indicates that Iraq did not operate its fermentors at maximal capacity. UNSCOM was not wholly confident of the accuracy of the production log, though it never explained why. However, there is no indication -- either in UNSCOM reports or in UNMOVIC statements -- that they actually believe Iraq produced this volume of anthrax. There is, again, a very large difference between what Iraq had the potential to produce in 1990, and what it is likely that it did actually produce."

  enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

  [Glen] Rangwala: "This is just plain wrong. Anthrax spores produced in 1990 were in liquid slurry form. They would have deteriorated markedly by the mid-1990s. The assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is as follows: 'Anthrax spores are extremely hardy and can achieve 65 percent to 80 percent lethality against untreated patients for years. Fortunately, Iraq does not seem to have produced dry, storable agents and only seems to have deployed wet Anthrax agents, which have a relatively limited life." ["Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities" (1998), p.13]

  The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum [??] toxin; enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

  Rangwala: "This is plain inaccurate. The only assessment of UNSCOM in this regard was in the January 1999 report, which stated that it could not account for 460kg of casein, the growth media for botulinum toxin. That would be enough to produce 1200 litres of the toxin. The US has independently claimed that Iraq had more casein, but that is not - and has never been - the UN's assessment."

  Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

  Zunes: "This figure is far higher than most independent estimates. The former chief weapons inspector for UNSCOM stated that at least 95% of Iraq's chemical weapons had been accounted for and destroyed by 1998. With the embargo preventing the import of new materials, satellites eyeing possible sites for new production, and the return of UN inspectors, it is highly dubious that Iraq could develop an offensive chemical weapons arsenal, particularly since virtually all of their ballistic missiles capable of carrying such weapons have also been accounted for and destroyed. In addition, if Saddam Hussein's possession of chemical weapons is really such a major concern for the U.S. government, why did the United States send Iraq tons of toxic chemicals during the 1980s, even when it became apparent that they were being used for weapons?"

  U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them, despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

  From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs.

  Rangwala: "The only defector who has gone public with this claim is Adnan Saeed al-Haideri. It's interesting to note that in his first press conference, he didn't make this claim at all. It was only after he was "debriefed" by an official from the Iraqi National Congress - the group supported politically and financially by the Pentagon - that he started making these claims."

  These are designed to produce germ warfare agents and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

  The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.

  Zunes: "True. What the president failed to mention is that in 1998 the International Atomic Energy Agency also reported that Iraq's nuclear capability had been completely dismantled. More recently, IAEA director El-Baradei, in his January 27 report to the UN Security Council, reported there was no evidence to suggest that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program."

  The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

  Rangwala: "Iraq in 1981-82 tried unsuccessfully to import yellowcake (unrefined uranium) from Niger. The UK government has given no signs that it was not referring to this episode. The IAEA have repeatedly asked the US and UK for information about this, without success. Either the UK is refusing to comply with the UN weapons inspectors, or its claims are irrelevant."

  ...

  Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to intimidate witnesses. Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations.

  Mahajan: "Iraq is not 'blocking' U-2 flights - it simply cannot guarantee their safety. The reason it can't guarantee their safety is that U.S. and U.K. planes constantly overfly Iraqi airspace, in violation of international law, and Iraq maintains its sovereign right to defend its airspace. If the United States was serious about inspections, it would suspend or end the no-fly zones so that the U-2's can collect information."

• Bush also stated that "Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate or attack."
  • What Bush has omitted is how much of that ability to build such weapons came with direct support from the U.S. in the 80s when looking to destabilize Iran, as mentioned earlier.
  • In addition, as mention on this web site's sections on Arms Control and the Arms Trade, many nations have felt the need to bolster their militaries due to perception of external threats from larger powers or because neighbors have been purchasing weapons systems of various kinds. Hence, the risk of an arms race is often there. Side NoteAnd, as Stephen Zunes comments in the above-mentioned annotation, "This is hardly the 'only possible explanation.' The most likely reason for a country in a heavily armed region within missile range of two nuclear powers to pursue weapons of mass destruction is for deterrence. Even the CIA has reported that there is little chance that Iraq would use WMDs for offensive purposes in the foreseeable future. By contrast, so says this CIA analysis, there is a far greater risk that Saddam Hussein would use whatever WMDs he may possess in the event of a U.S. invasion, when deterrence has clearly failed and he no longer has anything to lose."
• Bush often referred to various reports by his intelligence agencies on links to terrorism, use of weapons of mass destruction, etc, yet as highlighted further up, the CIA has often said it has not found such links.
• Bush also highlighted the gross human rights abuses that Iraq has long been known for and concluded, "If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning."
  • Yet, most of the claims here were not false as such, but the propaganda technique used here was to omit other details, such as the U.S. support at the time of a lot of these violations.
  • The response from Stephen Zunes in the above-mentioned annotation is worth highlighting: "The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi armed forces against Kurdish villages took place in the 1980s when the U.S. was backing Saddam Hussein's government. The U.S. even covered up for the Halabja massacres and similar atrocities by falsely claiming it was the Iranians -- then the preferred enemy -- who were responsible. Human rights organizations have indeed reported torture and other human rights abuses by the Iraqi regime and did so back in the 1980s when the U.S. was supporting it. As a result, one can only assume that this professed concern about human rights abuses is insincere, particularly since the Bush Administration is currently sending military and police aid to repressive regimes such as Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Colombia, Egypt and others that are guilty of similar human rights abuses. If President Bush really thinks that this constitutes evil, why does he support governments that engage in such crimes?"
• Towards the end, he added that "We seek peace."

Colin Powell Presentation of Evidence Before U.N. Security Council

On February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State, General Colin Powell presented the case for a strike on Iraq. In what was regarded in many mainstream media circles as a "performance" he presented a plethora of information using a variety of media, from satellite photos, tapes of alleged intercepts of conversations between Iraqi military officers, information from defectors, slides and charts, etc. Though there was a lot of information provided, there were roughly three aims of the presentation:

• To show that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction
• Links with terrorists such as Al Qaeda
• Deception by Iraq of the U.N. weapons inspectors, and hiding weapons

As detailed further above, all three of these themes have been questioned, and top officials have often said that for example, there is no evidence of nuclear weapons development (though there are some questions about chemical and biological weapons but much has been destroyed in prior years), that the links with terrorism is dubious.

Leading up to the presentation, a number of media outlets were pointing out that Powell himself said that he would provide no "smoking gun" but would nonetheless provide a compelling case.

Danny Schechter highlights some of the media strategies and other issues used in the build up to the presentation:

But, even after the speech was made, there has been some criticism of the way the media has handled it. For example, as media watchdog FAIR has highlighted, there has been a lack of scrutiny of some of Powell's claims by some mainstream media outlets, giving the effect, intentional or not, of journalists treating allegations as fact.

A number of nations were not convinced by Powell's speech.

Scott Ritter, key member of U.N. weapons inspections during the 1998 crisis has been an ardent critic of the current attempts by the U.S. and U.K. to go to war. He commented on Powell's speech that

For some additional analysis on Powell's statement, see for example the following:

• A First Response to Sec. Colin Powell's Presentation Concerning Iraq by Professor Glen Rangwala, a lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University. He addresses many points that Powell makes. (Note that Rangawala also has a detailed analysis of the claims concerning Iraq's proscribed weapons capabilities.)
• Responding to Colin Powell by Rahul Mahajan, February 7, 2003

Playing the Morality Card

Presumably stung by the lack of a "smoking gun" at the February 14, 2003 reports by the chief U.N. inspectors to the U.N. Security Council, and with the onset of mass demonstrations around the world the following day, Tony Blair appeared to concede that he would take the U.N. route. (He had previously stressed on a televised interview that he would in circumstances where he disagreed with the U.N. Security Council decision, act anyway.) But more than that, his speech on the morning of the February 15 to his Labor Party revealed a change in concern over Iraq. No longer was there an "imminent threat" (which ironically, had been a repeated claim for many months), or proof of nuclear weapons, or weapons of mass destruction, or possible links to terrorism. So instead, the justification of war seems to have shifted to the morality and justness of deposing of Saddam Hussein.

U.S. Says Some 50 Willing Nations For War. Some Didn't Know They Were

On the eve of war, the U.S. annouced that it had some 30 nations supporting it, in a "coalition of the willing" offering various means of support. Yet, the radio show Democracy Now! (March 19, 2003) highlighted some of the complexities in this support:

Later, this number increased to 50. However, some nations wanted to remain anonymous, while others did not wish to be on it at all, as highlighted by AFP (March 29, 2003). In addition, as Jan Oberg of the Swedish research organization, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, says that given that 95.8% of the troops come from four countries (U.S., U.K., Australia and Poland), "It would be more appropriate to call the aggressors the Gang of Four."

Draft Resolution Designed to Fail and Therefore Allow War

Politicians supporting war of course are not going to analyze the negative side of their own proposed resolutions. Hence, often not mentioned was that at least one of the terms in the draft second resolution would be unaccetable whether the receiver of the demands was ruthless and despotic, or completely democratic and peaceful. This resolution was designed, then, as some would argue, to ensure Saddam Hussein would lose, and no-one would expect Saddam to surrender, hence, this resolution basically supported war. The BBC mentioned this:

Bush/Blair Dropped Second War Resolution due to International Opposition

By March 17, 2003, it was clear that for all the pressure from the U.S. and U.K. (and Spain), described above, only Bulgaria was a sure bet. All the rest remained unconvinced and opposed.

Seeing no chance for winning a second resolution put forth by the British and Americans, and noting that France was going to veto it anyway, the second resolution was withdrawn.

But how this was handled, and spun, is interesting to note:

Not International 'Deadlock' But Opposition to US/UK

A common phrase used in some mainstream media outlets, for example, the BBC, has been the benign phrase 'deadlock', or 'deep division' or some other phrase that gives a false impression of an even split. Yet, by most accounts it has been an opposition to the U.S./U.K. position, given that most nations were going to oppose war or abstain (an opposition but without formally noting so, so as not to face the future wrath of the US/British.)

In addition, withdrawing from the UN process highlighted a number of things.

• Withdrawing the second resolution highlighted international opposition, especially in the Security Council
• But withdrawing ironically also may imply that official history will never record such opposition, because it was never put to the vote.
• Also ironically, Iraq technically speaking (though in real terms it would not amount to much), has the right under Article 51 to use force to defend itself. Had the U.S. and U.K. managed to get Security Council Authorization for war (eventually if not now), Iraq would have had no such right.
• Withdrawal paved way for the British, Americans and Spanish to:
  • Blame France for the breakdown at the U.N.
  • Decide to go its own way and go to war anyway.

Blaming France

For a while the French were being blamed for causing rifts amongst Europeans and Americans. Now, more explicitly than ever, as the U.S. and U.K. ambassadors to the United Nations gave speeches to the press on March 17, 2003, they explicitly blamed France solely for the breakdown because, as they claimed, France would veto anything.

However, it was not only France, but Russia that also indicated it could use its veto. But not only that, most of the U.N. Security Council seemed opposed.

Consider what Tom Craver, a correspondent at the United Nations for the BBC's political news programme, NewsNight had to say:

Members All Knew That Serious Consequences in 1441 Meant War, Even Though US and UK Themselves Said it did Not

As mentioned further above, even the American and British ambassadors to the U.N., and even Tony Blair himself, just after 1441 was passed stated that there was no automatic trigger for war, and the Security Council had to decide.

1441 was passed unanimously precisely because most countries did not want automatic war type of clause to be in the resolution.

However, from the likes of Britain's Home Secratary David Blunkett (interviewed on BBC, March 16, 2003), and Colin Powell (March 17, 2003), they have said that it was obvious what "serious consequences" meant, and that it meant war. Most people agree that this is what the intention of the U.S. and U.K. was. However, technically, the resolution did not authorize war, and, the last paragraph stated that the U.N. remained seized of the matter, meaning nations had to come back to the U.N. to determine another resolution.

Instead, using spin, it has been argued, with almost no challenge, that the other nations should have known this, and so it is ok to go to war, regardless of what the majority of the council thinks.

Is War Legal or Illegal

In announcing the withdrawal of the draft second resolution, the U.K. ambassador said "The co-sponsors reserve their right to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq." This went unchallenged by various media outlets and journalists, but the questions would have included, what gave these nations the right to take actions into their own hands, when the final paragraph of 1441 said that "the Security Council remained seized of the matter"?

In Britain, the Attorney General annouced March 17, that war on Iraq would be legal, because of the combined effects of two resolutions from 1991, 678 and 687, and with 1441.

But many lawyers disagree. Some say that explicit authorization from the U.N. Security Council is still needed. International Human Rights Lawyer, Keir Starmer QC, argues:

The Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) in New York detailed in a report the illegality of war. They also highlighted that Bush's doctrine of pre-emptive strikes itself was illegal, saying that, "In 1946, the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected German arguments of the necessity for preemptive attacks against its neighbors and instead outlawed preventive war as a crime against the peace. In the Tribunal's judgment, 'To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.'" (The phrase "supreme international crime" was the condemnation and definition used at the Nuremberg Trials.)

(See also also a debate between the executive director of CESR and a professor of law who argues that war is legal. The previous link will allow you to listen to a real audio archive of the show. You can also watch a streaming video of that show.)

War Is Not the Only Option; Resolution 377

The United Nations Charter, which binds all member states, in Article 2 states that all members "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force".

Ignoring for a moment that the build up has actually involved both the use of threat and use of force (Coalition forces had begun to deploy troops and bomb key installations in Iraq before March 20, 2003, when bombing really commenced), the United Nations charter highlights that the purpose of the U.N. is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."

Given there was so much disagreement in the U.N. Security Council on whether to authorize war or not (the U.S./U.K. now revealing that this was their intention all along, the French/Chinese/Russian camp not seeing the need for war), the solution to by-pass the U.N. and go to war anyway, sets many dangerous precedents. For example

• It sends a message to the world that if the U.S./U.K. don't like anyone else (for there are "allies" that are gross violators of human rights in various ways), they could be next. This would normally fall in line with geopolitical interests that the U.S. would have.
• Any nations fearing U.S. actions may think twice about developing their military capabilities
• Or they may feel the need to increase their military capabilities, otherwise they would face the fate of Iraq.
• Other nations may also see fit to do as they please as well, regardless of if the U.N. authorizes action or not.
• The anger and resentment this has cause around the world risks fueling more terrorism in the future.

However, the impasse, or lack of unanimity at the Security Council did not justify action outside of U.N. authority, for there has been an alternative option used a number of times in the past: A little-mentioned U.N. resolution, 377 A (V), also known as "United For Peace".

The resolution addressed the case where there was a lack of concensus. The Center for Constitutional Rights in New York and others have been raising the awareness of this resolution, and highlights:

• The Uniting for Peace resolution, allows the General Assembly to meet to consider the threat to international peace and it can then recommend collective measures to U.N. Members to maintain or restore peace.
• If one U.N. Member State requests that a meeting be convened to consider adoption of such a resolution and either seven Members of the Security Council or a majority of the Members of the General Assembly agree, an emergency special session will be called and the General Assembly will come together to discuss the threat to international peace.

Citing the resolution directly:

Note, the above resolution recognizes for example, that

• The Security Council on occasion may not agree
• In such cases, the larger and more inclusive General Assembly can get involved.
• The General Assembly has a responsibility to get involved.

This resolution was first created in 1950. It is posted on the United Nations web site as a land mark document. Ironically, the U.S. was one of the main supporters of this important resolution.

However, as of March 21, 2003, Reuters reports (March 21, 2003) that the U.S. has been pressuring many nations to avoid having a special session of the General Assembly.

War Is Not Only Option; Lack Of Patience Is Not Enough of a Reason for War

One of the many reasons Tony Blair, Colin Powell and other stated that it was time for war was their impatience with more inspections. Despite other nations and Hans Blix himself saying inspection processes were working and they just needed more time, the reason of impatience was one of the reasons given to stop, and choose war, instead.

Yet, patience and its limits is subjective, which is why the Security Council would have to decide together whether to go to war, or choose another course of action. Because the U.S. and U.K. realized, or felt they did not have enough support for war, that not enough other nations were as impatient, they decided to go to war, anyway.

Major Resignations

In Tony Blair's Labour Party, a key minister, Robin Cook, resigned. In a long resignation speech at the House of Commons, he received an unprecedented standing ovation. Amongst many things, he said:

The BBC, commenting on Cook's speech said the following:

Other ministers also resigned during those days leading up to war.