LIBERIA: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge

• by Rebecca Murray (monrovia)
• Saturday, December 26, 2009
• Inter Press Service

The strike, just 15 kilometres down the coastal road from the capital, Monrovia, fuelled doubts about the AFL's ability to cope, as the country still faces a number of threats to stability.

The troops were alarmed by rumours that their U.S. military supervisors were to transfer 500 more recruits to Edward Binyan Kesselly (EBK) army base the following day. They would be forced to double up in already cramped living quarters.

'The soldiers started grumbling about all the promises of free education, families living with us, personal accommodation,' says former Private Patrick Fayia, identified by the authorities as one of the leaders and dismissed.

'As nobody responded, the soldiers remained indoors,' he says. 'Because if we left for physical training, the sergeants would come and lock our doors, and when the new soldiers came, they would plug them in. Four to a room, that's how it was going to be.'

That evening, on September 25, Liberia's ministry of defence abruptly dismissed 17 accused ringleaders, claiming accordance with military law, but no formal inquiry was ever made.

'I was dismissed without investigation,' laments former Private Aaron Powo. 'Everything we do in the army is documented. They have your file. So I expected them to go to my file, to see what kind of person I was before taking action. It was disheartening.'

After Liberia's brutal civil war ended in 2003, the U.S. assumed responsibility for dismantling the tattered, factionalised national army, and under the auspices of the Pentagon's AFRICOM, built a new force from scratch.

For up to $250 million the U.S. has planned, recruited, strenuously vetted and trained the 2,000-strong AFL, hiring expensive commercial military trainers from DynCorp International, and Lockheed Martin's Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), on classified contracts.

'Part of the lag between recruitment and training was unavoidable, given the need for vetting,' observes the International Crisis Group in a January 2009 report. 'However, the delay was much longer than would normally have been required, and as a result, a significant portion of the (Security Sector Reform) budget was used for paying DynCorp staff, who were unable to do their jobs.'

Six years into post-war reconstruction, the U.S. will finally hand over control of the AFL to Liberia's Ministry of Defence.

But last year's strike at the EBK barracks highlights concerns about the AFL's youth and inexperience, operational capacity, training and role.

Liberia remains extremely vulnerable to a number of destabilising threats.

The national disarmament and rehabilitation programme for ex-combatants ended this year on a weak note. And with the global economic crisis worsening the scarcity of government funds and high unemployment, nearly 70% of a total 3.5 million Liberians live in poverty on less than one dollar a day.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) published their final report about Liberia's decades-long war, but testimony from hundreds of victims has been overshadowed by the angry threats of former warlords - like Senator Prince Johnson from Nimba County - named for prosecution by a special court.

Other TRC recommendations include a 30-year ban from public office for U.S.-favoured President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, for her early support of Charles Taylor, now standing trial for war crimes at The Hague.

Meanwhile, violence in volatile neighbours Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire threatens to spill over Liberia's borders.

Under U.S. plans, the AFL will join other national security agencies, like the Liberian National Police (LNP) and Immigration, to work with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) leading up to the November 2011 presidential elections.

A calm electoral season will increase pressure from international donors for UNMIL's drawdown of 10,000 peacekeepers, and subsequent withdrawal from Liberia.

But the AFL, trained by the U.S. in conventional warfare, is flawed by its lack of strong and experienced civilian leadership, and an ill-defined role that has delayed its expected readiness to 2012.

'We have a strong minister of defence,' says Colonel A L Rumphrey, head of the U.S. Office of Security Cooperation in Liberia. 'There are strong individuals, but the staff are only one step in strength. There are pretty strong deputy defence ministers, but below them, (the staff) is inexperienced, not tested. They have trouble delegating.'

These weaknesses are apparent in Liberia's revised National Defence Act, passed in August 2008, which muddied the AFL's role. The legislation states that while the army's primary mission is to fight external aggression, it also has a role in counter-insurgency, terrorism and encroachment.

This contradicts the National Security Strategy, sanctioned by President Sirleaf's administration eight months earlier, which says the AFL will only 'defend the territorial integrity of Liberia from external aggression'.

Colonel Rumphrey says adamantly, 'Internal threats are a police issue. The LNP should be a replacement for UNMIL.'

The police department's elite Emergency Response Unit (ERU) is being built up to combat riots and insurgency, but only 287 out of a planned 500 ERU personnel have been trained, and now fill policing gaps outside their mandate like patrolling streets. UNMIL is charged with training the police.

The AFL's leadership training is a weak point. Defence Minister Brownie Samukai says 'The training period for our officers is extremely short. As compared to any officer training anywhere in the world, I think the training of the AFL - particularly the officers' training - needs to be thoroughly upgraded.

'I also believe garrison training is not fully adequate for the reality of the entire country, so there are some challenges there.' Also falling short is the goal of female recruits making up 20 percent of the AFL. 'As of August 1, only 58 of the 2,000-strong army are women,' reports the UNMIL Progress Report in August 2009.

This summer the U.S. handed back the Barclay Training Centre on Monrovia's beachfront, infamous as the site of the mass execution of government ministers in 1980 by coup leader Samuel K Doe. The U.S. still controls the EBK barracks until the New Year.

On a recent visit to the EBK base, large white tents to accommodate incoming troops were seen pitched inside the entrance. Older brick housing, the hospital, cafeteria and the relatively upscale 'Officer's Club' - a mess hall used primarily by private military contractors - dot the grounds. A watchtower looms over a blue lagoon, and the breaking waves of the Atlantic Ocean beyond.

It is lunchtime, and troops gather excitedly to collect their monthly paycheck averaging $120, before heading to the cafeteria for their one free daily meal of rice and cassava leaf.

Private Amos Kphehe and Private Varney Perry eat hungrily from plastic plates on the cramped porch of their dorm. For two years the young servicemen have shared a room into which two lockers and two single beds barely fit. There is an electricity cut, and the concrete floor, which they try to cover with linoleum, compounds the dinginess.

'It is clear that EBK was built for 800-plus persons,' says Minister Samukai. 'When they started the programme they put 2,000 persons in there. Where is the logic, the common sense?'

'I think in 2005, when it was expected that 200 million dollars would be expended for the training, redevelopment and construction of facilities - and the contractors were not shortcutting the process - we would have got the best accommodation for those individuals,' he says. 'So someone didn't do their homework. And so we have a congested situation at EBK.'

On Jan. 1, the Liberian Ministry of Defence will assume total control of the AFL. Although the U.S. will leave up to 60 American military 'mentors', and UNMIL has stepped in to support low-level joint training of the AFL, Samukai is realistic about what the new army can achieve.

'If you are looking at numbers and making a comparison you'll appreciate that 2,000 cannot compare to the thousands of well-equipped UNMIL troops, or the capabilities, experience, training and organisation the US has.'

Samukai's ministry has had very little influence on training to date, and he believes military-to-military support from the US and Liberia's ECOWAS partners will be vital.

But with Liberia's economic recovery stalled, and the danger of donor fatigue, funding for the AFL's continued development is in direct competition with needed government investment in health, education, justice and the country's infrastructure.

'The greatest long-term challenge for the MOD and associated ministries is to do more with less,' reports the International Crisis Group. 'As the US gradually disengages (from Security Sector Reform), managerial and financial responsibilities will mount rapidly. The response must be both political and technical, with civilian control established and political manipulation avoided.'

For now, the AFL is full of motivated personnel who survived the gruelling vetting and training process for a chance at a job, wages, university scholarship or to preserve peace in their war-torn country.

'As a young man I think I should have a role to play. And I feel joining the army is one of the best ways to serve my nation,' says former Private Aaron Powo sadly.

© Inter Press Service (2009) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service

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