Global IssuesMIDEAST: Unity Moves May Test U.S. Resolve
Throw a stone into troubled waters and you won't see concentric circles rippling out. Many stones have recently been thrown into the muddy waters of the Middle East - the Gaza War, Israel's electoral lurch rightwards and the Arab world setting up stall in advance of the Obama Administration preparing new directions for the region.
The stones have been cast and a process set in motion.
Now, an eerie lull is enveloping the region. At this transitional moment, there's still no clear picture whether the rippling circles - in Israel, in the Arab world, in Washington and between Gaza and the West Bank - will eventually overlap and calm the waters.
Within Israel, the consequences of its war launched against Hamas in Gaza are all coming to a head. The next 48 hours are critical.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is convening an emergency cabinet meeting Tuesday. He's ready to act if Hamas is ready to bite the bullet of his ultimatum and agrees to strike a prisoner exchange deal - a captured Israeli corporal, Gilad Shalit, for 450 Palestinians held in Israel gaols.
Olmert had previously conditioned the concluding of any ceasefire arrangement with Hamas and the lifting of the siege of Gaza on a successful prisoner exchange. Actually, the caretaker prime minister 'has an asset beyond the Hamas prisoners - his successor, Benjamin Netanyahu,' Haaretz newspaper reporters Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff wrote. 'Olmert is telling Hamas - 'I'm your last chance for a deal, Netanyahu will not be so generous.''
Netanyahu may be staunchly opposed to the principle of any deal with Hamas, both on the prisoner exchange and on the ceasefire, though he's actually hoping that Olmert will produce the two-pronged deal with Hamas at the last gasp.
Netanyahu's discomfort with an uncompromising far-right coalition that he's stitching together also underlies his sudden rekindled interest in a broad centre-right government. Over the last 48 hours, the prime minister- designate made fresh overtures towards the Kadima party led by outgoing foreign minister Tzipi Livni. Netanyahu has given Livni an ultimatum of his own: you want far-right policies kept out of the picture - make up your mind by midweek, else I'll be compelled to rely on the hardliners.
Netanyahu is aware that an Olmert 'no-deal with Hamas' legacy will trap him between a rock and a hard place. With the Gaza war left inconclusive, his narrow right-wing government would soon be in collision course with Egypt, Europe and the U.S. over the difficulties that would create for the urgent reconstruction of Gaza while, domestically, the Israeli public might hold him responsible for making the war seem futile.
Wrapped up in these last-minute contortions, Israeli decision-makers seem oblivious to the sizeable ripples of a series of Arab initiatives and manoeuvres that have only taken shape since Netanyahu began trying to form a new Israeli government. This Arab effort aims to overlap with the start of a fresh U.S. Middle East policy. It includes an end to the isolation of Syria, the blurring of past distinctions between 'moderate' and 'extremist' Arab and Muslim states and, most critically, a determined bid to reconcile the rival Palestinian movements, Hamas and Fatah, and to push them towards a power-sharing agreement.
How both internal unity processes evolve could also have a major impact on how the Arab League formalises its position vis-à-vis a new U.S. policy during its summit at the end of the month in Doha.
'This is a Middle East quick to understand the new reality,' notes prominent Israeli Middle East Affairs analyst Zvi Bar'el, 'a Middle East that appreciates the need to prepare a landing strip for a Barack Obama seeking to make friends with the Muslim world and interested in a policy that favours dialogue, not war.' Israel risks becoming 'a footnote' in this process, cautions Bar'el.
Battling to forge their own new domestic coalitions, Israelis and Palestinians are all too keenly aware that the first true test of President Obama's declared determination not to allow the region to sink into a quagmire of inaction is actually theirs. Will Netanyahu with a centrist partner be more open to negotiations for a two-state solution? Will a Palestinian government that includes Hamas, but without explicit recognition of both Israel's right to exist and commitment to past agreements, be able to negotiate?
The U.S., for its part, is well aware of the worldwide anticipation that the Obama election generated and of the weighty expectation on their new President to bring about drastic change in the Middle East.
Even if Israelis and/or Palestinians choose not to create the domestic conditions propitious for a new U.S.-led drive for stability in the region, the U.S. can ill-afford to be deterred from serious moves aimed at bringing permanent calm to the region's turbulent waters.
© Inter Press Service (2009) — All Rights ReservedOriginal source: Inter Press Service